ABSTRACT: It is estimated that more than 300,000 people were killed in the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, hundreds of thousands more were injured, and approximately 1.3 million people were left homeless due to the failure of the building stock. This level of devastation can largely be attributed to political and economic issues including struggles with education, government oversight of civil works, and general lack of resources that historically prohibited the establishment of reliable civil infrastructure. Any reconstruction effort needs to understand the significant constraints these conditions create in order to provide truly empowering solutions that build genuine local capacity. This paper reviews our experiences during trips to Léogâne, Haiti, and the formulation of an empowerment model that evaluates the resiliency, feasibility, sustainability, and viability of potential solutions to reconstruction of urban housing. We discuss the results of an assessment of common construction systems in Haiti and present an alternate housing system compliant with the empowerment model to serve low-income displaced populations in Léogâne.
O n January 12, 2010, at 4:53 p.m. local time, a moment magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck the Republic of Haiti. The epicenter of the earthquake was 25 km southwest of the capital, Port-au-Prince (U.S. Geological Survey 2010), close to the city of Léogâne. While Haiti has experienced repeated severe hurricane and tropical storm disasters in recent years, this earthquake dwarfed these earlier events. It is estimated that more than 300,000 people were killed, hundreds of thousands more were injured, and approximately 1.3 million people were left homeless due to the failure of most of the building stock in the affected regions (Government of the Republic of Haiti 2010). In particular, Léogâne, a city of 130,000 people and one of Haiti's 140 communes, was completely devastated by the earthquake; an estimated 93% of its buildings were damaged, most of which collapsed (Eberhard et al. 2010) . According to the InterAmerican Development Bank, the earthquake was the most destructive event any country has experienced in modern times when measured in terms of the people killed as a percentage of the country's population (Cavallo et al. 2010) .
As shown in Fig. 1 , two years after the earthquake, despite the millions of dollars pledged through foreign aid and the well-intended efforts of the international community, the sad reality is that the most families displaced due to the earthquake (more than 600,000 Haitians; Phillips 2011) are still waiting in transitory shelters, without a clear road map toward safe permanent housing that they will be able to call home. While their environment deteriorated further under heavy seasonal rains, hurricanes, and the cholera outbreaks of late 2010 (Farmer 2011) , they faced a new fear over forced evictions with no access to permanent housing options (Phillips 2011) . Recent surveys have found that 34% of Haitians reported leaving the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps because they were forcibly evicted and have been unable to find sustainable housing, forcing them into even worse living conditions (International Organization for Migration 2011). Unfortunately, their plight creates a considerable risk that wellintentioned aid and recovery will pose greater harm than good, similar to trends observed in Africa, as pressure to meet immediate human needs often leads to imported resources and infrastructure that cannot be sustained after nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) withdraw their aid (Moyo 2009 ).
While many agree that sustainable redevelopment and self-reliance are essential for Haiti, few appreciate how they can be practically achieved, particularly in the domain of urban residential redevelopment. Haiti is the poorest Western nation, with high import taxes and severe deforestation (Farmer 2011) , and construction practices cannot rely on the many engineered materials that are required in traditional code-compliant designs used in other seismically active regions and even other parts of the developing world due to the lack of affordable local inventory. The preexisting economic desperation and inaccessibility of financing for homes in Haiti have perpetuated many practices that enhance structural vulnerability. For example, most homes can be classified as nonengineered construction Marshall et al. 2011; Mix et al. 2011) , executed in the absence of any formal building code, that unfolds in incremental stages over many years as savings are accumulated, Figure 1 . Transitory sheltering for families in Léogâne (left) , whose hand-painted addresses on customized shelters (center) suggest an understanding of the long path to a permanent home, while others remain in informal shelters more than 2 years after the earthquake (right) resulting in high variability in materials and workmanship. Due to the lack of affordable constructiongrade wood, for use either as formwork or as a building material, and the high cost of steel, Haitians use construction with heavy masonry walls made of hand-pressed concrete masonry units (CMUs) and lightly reinforced, undersized concrete columns (Fig. 2) , frequently with no beams, leading to systems with inadequate strength and ductility. This combination creates systems that perform well under the strong winds common in the Caribbean but that proved to be extremely vulnerable to an earthquake, failing through brittle collapse modes (Mix et al. 2011) . These factors create what may be the most difficult reconstruction effort following any major disaster, requiring thoughtful policies and incentives capable of effecting long-term enhancement of local capacity (Kijewski-Correa and Taflanidis 2012).
The writers' attempt to contribute to this recovery has included four trips to Léogâne over the last 2 years (more information on these trips may be found at http://www.engineering2empower.org/). The first trip (March 2010) focused on postquake reconnaissance and identification of the vulnerabilities that contributed to the extensive structural collapses; the second (August 2010) focused on a survey of cultural preferences in urban housing and local construction materials and practices; the third (March 2011) was devoted to a Community Planning Workshop for Léogâne, discussed later in this paper; and the fourth (December 2011) was dedicated to gathering labor and material pricing and surveying cultural preferences to support the new housing paradigms discussed in the last section of this paper. These experiences have reminded us of the legitimate danger that necessity and desperation will lead to a reliance on heavily subsidized and imported engineered designs that are well beyond the financial reach of most families. This danger results from the common engineering approach of tweaking existing construction practices and design code provisions based on observed vulnerabilities after catastrophic events (Youd et al. 2000; Uzarski and Arnold 2001; Jain et al. 2002) . However, the lack of education, codification, and oversight to regulate construction processes in Haiti provides immense challenges and precludes the approaches of simply refining or expanding the body of knowledge. The challenges in Haiti have been dismissed, due to lack of understanding of the constraints, under the assumption that resilience could be achieved by simply importing and enforcing U.S. or international building codes and established systems; some have speculated that building code adoption and strict enforcement are the solution to the Haitian urban housing dilemma (Lindell 2010) . This belief has also contributed to well-intentioned efforts to educate masons, architects, and engineers to facilitate Haitian-led masonry reconstruction, which may eventually lead, in the absence of donor funds and oversight, to the reemployment of the same building systems that proved deadly in the 2010 earthquake, as demonstrated in Fig. 2 (Kijewski-Correa and Taflanidis 2012). The scenario depicted in Fig. 2 unfortunately demonstrates the inadequacies and even dangers of well-intended efforts to facilitate the reconstruction of the residential housing stock in Haiti without a holistic understanding of the problem. This paper reviews the writers' experiences in offering alternatives to these practices, focusing on lessons learned when operating in unique resource-constrained environments (compared to recent disasters in more developed areas of the world). This discussion begins with Figure 2 . Time lapse of home that experienced a pancake collapse in Léogâne instigated by insufficient columns and heavy partitioning (left, documented in March 2010), undergoing reconstruction in August 2010 following re-education of the head mason with expressed concern over how to cast floor slabs (center, documented in August 2010), and continuing to a second floor with the same principles that created the original vulnerabilities (right, documented December 2011) the definition of an empowerment model and a rational approach to evaluating potential solutions in reconstruction against this model, including the proposal of alternative technologies and the processes that support them.
EMPOWERMENT MODEL FOR POSTQUAKE RECONSTRUCTION OF HOUSING IN HAITI For many in the civil and earthquake engineering community, the field reconnaissance in Haiti following the January 2010 earthquake was a sobering reminder that while the causes of failures were easy to identify, practical remedies proved far more elusive (Kijewski-Correa and Taflanidis 2012). In such settings, where basic human needs were often unmet even before the disaster, the understandable response would be to import immediate solutions. Certainly the importation of transitory solutions by NGOs, including shelters, was a necessary and important measure in postquake Haiti. However, the writers recognized that these solutions were transitory at best and that without the equally necessary and important step of introducing practical options for affordable permanent housing, many Haitians would be left indefinitely in these transitory shelters (see Fig. 1 ) or would revert to the failed construction practices of old (see Fig. 2 ). Ultimately, if any solution seeks to be a real option for the people of Haiti, it must avoid importation, imposition by foreign entities, or heavy subsidization and instead contribute to self-reliance. The writers set forth to formalize these requirements as an empowerment model for the postquake reconstruction of housing in Haiti.
Ultimately, an empowerment model seeks to shift practices in such a way that they can be sustained without intervention by foreign entities. To do so within the context of permanent housing, the empowerment model relies on four key tenets, visualized in Fig. 3 Although, from an engineering perspective, resiliency (safety) and feasibility (constructability) may be considered the most important, all four tenets must be simultaneously addressed if the solution can be hoped to have a lasting impact. Sustainability is especially important; the solution must be accessible to the target population without dependence on foreign aid. The following sections discuss each of the four tenets through the lens of our experiences in postquake Haiti and describe how they guided the development of an assessment tool to evaluate the compliance of solutions with the empowerment model.
Resiliency: Identifying Vulnerabilities in Multihazard Settings
Although situated in a seismically active region, before the January 2010 earthquake, Haiti had not experienced a significant seismic event since 1846. Due to this long period of seismic inactivity, Haitians were not cognizant of the possibility of major earthquakes. Haitian citizens, engineers, and construction crews openly admitted this during the writers' first visit (Mix et al. 2011) . Haitian housing trends before the quake were predicated on environmental requirements (tropical climate) and cultural preferences for privacy (individual living spaces) and security, subject to practical constraints related to lack of native resources, income, education, and government oversight. The high-resistance requirements against rain, strong L e a d e r s h i p a n d M a n a g e m e n t i n E n g i n e e r i n g winds, and flooding from the frequent tropical storms and hurricanes justified the established heavy concrete and masonry construction. Furthermore, the cultural preferences for privacy and security played a pivotal role in highly partitioned residential housing design and the common practice of either vented decorative concrete bricks or iron bars for windows. Unfortunately, these practices resulted in significantly greater seismic mass during the earthquake and thereby generated larger forces. Updated assessments of the seismic hazard suggest that there is substantial earthquake risk throughout Haiti, with locations such as Port-au-Prince and the Enriquillo Valley (the epicenter of recent seismic activity) demonstrating increased vulnerability due to potential site amplification phenomena (Frankel et al. 2010) . Because these revised seismic hazard forecasts are significantly greater than previous estimates (Shedlock 1999) , permanent housing introduced in the coming years must present resilient solutions against both earthquakes and hurricanes. With the hazards well understood, it is thus important to characterize the vulnerabilities created by the established Haitian housing trends, beginning first with some unique attributes of the structural systems used.
Due to lack of resources, most housing in urban areas in Haiti uses a combination of reinforced concrete columns, often without beams, and unreinforced masonry walls made of CMUs as their primary structural system Marshall et al. 2011; Mix et al. 2011) . The high cost of imported steel implies that the amount of reinforcement used in this style of construction is often compromised. This basic structural system is then adapted based on the resources of the family to one of three home classes shown in Fig. 4 ; lower-income homes are single story, without any ring beam to tie the system, and topped with a wood-framed, corrugated metal roof; middle-and higher-income homes use a larger and potentially higher quality implementation of the system with a concrete slab roof to afford the provision to add floors later (see also Fig. 2 ). These slabs can be considered flat plates, devoid of beams to tie the lateral system and without the presence of column capitals or drop panels that would increase the shear and moment resistance of the system.
Bearing this in mind, the writers' reconnaissance identified several recurring failure mechanisms in the January 2010 earthquake, as shown in Fig • Shear failures: Rigid exterior and interior walls constructed with lower-quality CMUs are sufficiently stiff to attract seismic forces but have insufficient strength to resist them, transferring significant shear forces to adjacent columns on failure.
• Flexible diaphragms and punching shear failures:
Flat slabs (serving as both floors and roofs) lacked sufficient diaphragm action to engage columns and form an effective lateral system in homes with elongated floor plans, lack of beams, and inappropriately reinforced column-plate connections.
The following factors contributed to these failure mechanisms:
• Undersized or underreinforced columns: Columns were not sized for strength but for constructability (match depth of CMU walls implemented first in construction sequence) and/or were inadequately detailed or confined due to complete lack of design and construction provisions and the high cost of steel (high import taxes).
• Excessive mass: Reinforced concrete was used for floor/ roof systems and CMUs for all partitions.
• Poor materials: Concrete was mixed on the ground from smooth river rock and beach sands, large aggregates often separated from the mix in casting, weak CMU blocks were used for masonry walls, Figure 4 . Photos of existing structural systems in Haiti across the resource spectrum: low-income, middle-income, and high-income houses (left to right)
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and in some cases smooth reinforcing steel was used in columns.
• Incremental construction: Houses were constructed over an extended period of time, causing significant variation in material quality and worker skill.
These vulnerabilities and constraints constitute critical considerations for any resilient rebuilding effort.
Feasibility: Understanding and Leveraging Local Capacity
In order to achieve the ultimate goal of empowering Haiti to rebuild with the proper knowledge and training to avoid similar devastation in future earthquakes, all recommendations must operate within the existing modalities of building material production, construction, and crew organization. With respect to building material production, there are three staples of Haitian construction-cement, reinforcing steel (fè in Kreyòl), and CMU (bloc in Kreyòl). Cement and reinforcing steel are imported from the Dominican Republic, and CMUs were traditionally hand pressed locally using sand and cement, with wide-ranging (typically low) quality [ Fig. 6 (a)], although mechanically processed CMUs are now being produced in Léogâne. Not only have CMUs become a critical element for partitioning to achieve security and privacy, but they also serve an important role in the construction sequence. Due to deforestation, the availability of wood for formwork is limited; therefore, erecting CMU walls first adjacent to rebar cages anchored into the slab or foundation has an important practical implication: It effectively provides formwork for up to two sides of a column. The formwork for the remaining sides of the column is planked with available scrap wood [Fig. 6(b) ]. Due to this construction practice, it is fairly common for the size of the CMU blocks to dictate the size of the concrete columns used, regardless of the lateral or even gravity demands of the structure, explaining one of the common vulnerabilities noted in the previous section (Mix et al. 2011) . Admittedly, this construction sequence does resemble that of confined masonry, common for aseismic design throughout the developing world (Coburn and Robin 2002) ; however, Haitian OCTOBER 2012 L e a d e r s h i p a n d M a n a g e m e n t i n E n g i n e e r i n g prequake construction practices were lacking several essential elements of this system, including proper keying of the block at the column interface, reinforcement through the CMUs, and adequate-strength block Mix et al. 2011 ).
For middle-and high-income homes, once all the CMU walls are constructed and concrete columns cast, plywood sheets are shored up to create a formwork for the concrete slabs generally cast of CMUs, embedded in concrete with mild reinforcement [ Fig. 6(c) ]. Concrete is mixed on site, often by shovel on the ground using water from adjacent shallow wells, and while superior materials are available, cost often drives the use of more affordable smooth river rocks and cheaper fine aggregates, such as beach sand, which contains salts that reduce concrete durability. With respect to crew organization, the writers were able to document three models for construction teams (Mix et al. 2011 ). The first is the skilled foreman model, in which one person has formal training from a university and instructs the rest of the team. This model works well; however, because of the value placed on such expertise, these construction teams are often too costly for most residential construction and are mostly used in larger commercial projects. The second model is an apprentice model, in which the trade is passed down through generations of a family. This model was more evident in the high-income residential construction in Léogâne. It is customary for crews in this category to be employed over short terms, and only when they have proved their skills do they receive longer employment contracts. Finally, the last model employs a master builder, one person in a community who helps everyone build their homes. This was the most prominent model for low-income housing. Master builders are rarely formally trained but have some idea of construction techniques through either their own experience or experience passed down by family and friends. Particularly with respect to residential construction, the latter two models are most prevalent. While builders in all three models have accumulated considerable formal or informal expertise in concrete and masonry construction, they still must operate within the constraints created by lack of financial resources, which explains not only the aforementioned construction sequence, but also the underuse of steel and many other questionable construction practices.
Understanding these issues of feasibility leads to a very important realization: Lack of standards and oversight means that any housing alternative needs to establish means for incorporating quality control within the construction sequence. Otherwise, economic desperation will lead to continued questionable practices that can ultimately manifest as seismic vulnerabilities.
Sustainability: Finding Solutions Accessible to the Bottom of the Pyramid As discussed previously, there is no shortage of masons and crews with skilled or apprentice bosses to lead the reconstruction of homes in Léogâne (and in Haiti in general); however, there is a shortage of resources to procure their services. Interviews with one of the leading construction companies in Léogâne indicated that the upper-, middle-, and lower-income homes shown in Fig. 4 retail for US$50,000, $25,000, and $10,000, respectively. But before the January 2010 earthquake, the estimated average annual income of a Haitian was US$250-400 (Central Intelligence Agency 2010). With 80% of the population living under the poverty line and 54% living in what is termed "abject" poverty, most Haitians cannot even afford quality materials, let alone the services of professional construction teams. Haiti is also 95% deforested and has high import taxes on construction materials, implying that the general population cannot rely heavily on imported materials, including structural steel, aluminum, wood, and manufactured building materials. This lack of resources has contributed significantly to the vulnerabilities and capacity constraints identified in the previous sections. It also creates an environment in which permanent housing options must be derived from materials currently available in the local free market: cement and aggregate, with judicious reliance on more expensive materials like reinforcing steel and wood.
Sadly, this situation has been only deepened by the earthquake: Cash flow for families living in IDP camps has been reduced and has become sporadic [see Fig. 7(a) ], whereas the increased demand for housing due to the extensive collapses has escalated the prices of construction materials and land. This intersection of circumstances has made up-front financing for permanent homes even less accessible for most displaced families and drives a number of unsafe practices, such as the harvesting of yielded reinforcement from rubble [ Fig. 7(b) ].
These grave economic conditions will dramatically constrain the abilities of most Haitians to safely improve their current housing systems. Ultimately, improved housing will require higher-quality aggregate, more cement and more steel, or the formal introduction of confined masonry, any of which will lead to a significant increase in cost. These materials L e a d e r s h i p a n d M a n a g e m e n t i n E n g i n e e r i n g OCTOBER 2012 simply will not be affordable for the families living in IDP camps, who belong to the bottom of the economic pyramid. At the same time, any alternative housing model will have to deliver safety, but given the extreme poverty in Haiti, the model will have to compete in the open market with the preexisting masonry construction with respect to cost and construction time. Therefore, to avoid tragedy in the next earthquake, the poorest of Haitian families need to be presented with alternate affordable housing models with the tenet of sustainability at the forefront. One of the initial exercises at the workshop, a small-group visioning exercise with citizens of Léogâne, proved that independent discussions consistently converged to a short list of top priorities: health, education, zoning, and infrastructure. According to the citizens, all these themes have met recurring challenges posed by bureaucracy; lack of coordination between NGOs, the government, and the community of Léogâne; and still unresolved land tenure issues. In the subsequent days, each focus group set forth a different agenda and activities, although daily L e a d e r s h i p a n d M a n a g e m e n t i n E n g i n e e r i n g reporting and interaction between groups ensured that the outcomes of their discussions could guide the activities of groups with interdependent issues (Fig. 8) . The resulting workshop report provided recommendations in each of the eight focus areas for both shortand long-term recovery (Rebuild Léogâne 2011).
The engagement of the community on matters related to permanent housing revealed stigmas attached to multifamily housing (apartments) and materials like bamboo, recycled aggregates, and plywood partitioning that left most homeowners heavily invested in what they perceived as secure and familiar-concrete and CMU construction. Because of the persistent concerns regarding security in urban zones like Léogâne and the preference for the modern appearance of finished bloc for a proper home, displaced families desired homes with all the security, flexibility, and functionality that CMU homes afforded but without the vulnerabilities they tragically witnessed. While the participation of Léogâne's citizens was encouraging, it became evident that representation from IDPs was lacking. As a result, the writers' focus group executed Kreyòl-language field surveys with two local translators in the neighborhood of Ka Boulos (18°31.097 0 N, 72°38.049 0 W) to document the attitudes and expectations of Léogâne's most vulnerable displaced populations. Most (80%) of those surveyed in this camp did not own the land they had previously occupied, and many renters were indefinitely displaced because their landlords did not repair or rebuild the properties. These surveys, along with the interviews conducted with citizens attending the workshop, confirmed that families desired single-family (76% in favor) and single-story (94% in favor) homes that they could own outright (73% opposed renting). These homes must be able to accommodate an average of 4.35 persons within an average of 3.29 rooms. These results are consistent with practices throughout the region, where even the most modest of homes are generally divided into two bedrooms and at least one common area, with an external area for cooking and a nearby well and latrine. Throughout the spring of 2012, these same translators continued a modified version of this pilot survey among residents of Léogâne living in transitory shelters to further the writers' understanding of displaced family demographics and their experiences, perceptions, preferences, and expectations surrounding permanent housing [ Fig. 8(b) ].
The spring 2011 pilot surveys conducted during the workshop also revealed the displaced families' understanding of collapse mechanisms; 76% indicated that concrete block homes are safe and that it is the concrete slab roofs that are vulnerable. Thus, while the understanding of the dangers posed by heavy roof slabs was evident, an understanding of the role that CMU walls and undersized columns played in these failure mechanisms was considerably lacking. Past anthropological research and interactions with the workshop participants suggest that because Haitians' understanding and communication of concepts consistently deal in tangible and experiential modes, any educational programming about the vulnerability of past practices and the potential advantages of new practices will be viable only if they show an appreciation for the cultural context and use physical specimens, public demonstrations, and prototypes.
ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH THE EMPOWERMENT MODEL
Although it is clear that the four tenets of the empowerment model are important to identify, they are really only pragmatic if they can be used as a tool to evaluate proposed solutions. Such evaluations show that the failure of many proposals to carefully consider and satisfy one or more of the four tenets of this model explains why they have not provided lasting solutions to the Haitian housing dilemma (as demonstrated by the conditions depicted in Figs. 1 and 2 ). This then begs the question of how such tenets could be used to drive designs toward true empowerment.
Consider, for example, the solutions presented at the Building Back Better Communities Expo sponsored by the Clinton Foundation. Many proposals presented failed to meet basic engineering requirements, many homes retailed for $20,000-$30,000, and only about 1 in 10 relied exclusively on local materials (MacDonald 2011). Had basic expectations for designs akin to the tenets of the empowerment model been communicated in advance and had the proposals been scored with an appropriate assessment tool, not only would the submitters have been motivated to incorporate features that target long-term empowerment of the Haitian people, but there would have been an objective framework to score and rank proposed models.
This realization motivated us to use the four tenets contributing to the empowerment model, with appropriate mechanisms for community input, to develop a process to score and assess how well different reconstruction models meet the multidimensional needs explored in this paper thus far. This assessment process ensures that the empowerment model can serve not only as a framework for approaching urban L e a d e r s h i p a n d M a n a g e m e n t i n E n g i n e e r i n g OCTOBER 2012
housing problems, but also as the basis of an assessment tool to identify the strengths and weaknesses of proposed housing solutions.
Development of the Assessment Tool
Systems that evolve organically in resourceconstrained settings inherently satisfy the tenets of an empowerment model in that they are practices born of common experience with the support of the community. Unfortunately, these practices are not guided by engineering knowledge and can prove vulnerable to infrequent extreme events, as was the case in Haiti. In order to objectively evaluate not only the existing housing systems but also potential alternative systems for permanent housing in postquake Haiti, the writers developed an assessment rubric that measures compliance with the empowerment model's tenets by scoring specific attributes of homes. While the rubric discussed here was developed during the Community Planning Workshop (the writers' third trip) specifically to assess urban permanent housing options in Haiti, it can be readily adapted to other applications in the developing world. The attributes selected for the rubric, listed in Table 1 , were informed by the writers past fieldwork in Léogâne and by the feedback received from citizens participating in the workshop.
As demonstrated in Table 1 , each of the tenets of the empowerment model materializes as two or more attributes. Most attributes can be rated with one of four choices scored on a scale from 0 to 100, where a score of 100 is the most favorable. In two instances, an attribute has only binary scoring options that are punitive in nature; a negative score can be awarded for an undesirable behavior. Each attribute is then assigned a weighting as a simple way of reflecting items of high priority for the community being served; in this case, the weights were derived from a brainstorming exercise with Haitians at the Community Planning Workshop [ Fig. 9(a) ]. Participants indicated that security, seismic performance, and the use of local construction materials and processes were among the most important considerations. The weighted scores for each attribute are then summed to yield the composite score for a particular housing option. Certainly the scores assigned to each choice and the weights assigned to each attribute are subjective, and effective scoring does require some expertise, but what is important is the development of a rational and consistent framework for evaluating various reconstruction options across a spectrum of predetermined attributes embodying the wide-ranging constraints in Haiti and purposefully generalized to allow assessment at all three housing class levels. As such, this rubric encompasses attributes such as cost and quality control, issues that are very important to the families currently in IDP camps, but also addresses issues like cultural acceptability and construction time, attributes that may be more important to more affluent Haitians.
Many solutions may be offered for permanent housing in Haiti and, based on how they score using this rubric, may be appropriate for certain demographics and not others. Therefore, variations on the rubric could be developed with scoring and weighting adjusted to explicitly filter noncompliant designs outright; for example, for bottom-of-the-pyramid applications, material cost might be more heavily weighted, and the choices could be replaced with Haitian dollar amounts and with scores assigned to these choices levying heavy penalties for exceeding a certain price point accessible to most families in this demographic. In fact, the current lack of solutions that satisfy all four tenets for this population ultimately motivates the paradigm shift that will be discussed in the last section of this paper. Use of the rubric to target the solutions best serving a given demographic is encouraged, as it returns to the holistic approach of the empowerment model. In this way, it becomes not only an assessment tool but also a powerful tool within planning processes and design competitions to incentivize certain desirable attributes and disincentivize certain undesirable practices.
Application of the Assessment Tool: Databasing Potential Options
After the writers developed the rubric, the housing focus group identified the typologies best suited to Haitian reconstruction and the spectrum of materials that could be used for these primary load resisting systems, as well as their accompanying cladding and partitioning, if applicable [ Fig. 9(b) ]. Given the functional requirements of Haitian urban housing, the writers determined that primary load-resisting systems include load-bearing walls, confined masonry, and moment-resisting frames. This exercise did not seek to evaluate the feasibility of any system or material but rather to propose an exhaustive suite of options. While roof and flooring systems were also evaluated as part of this exercise (see complete report; Rebuild Léogâne 2011), this paper focuses on the primary load-resisting systems only; results are presented in Table 2 . CMUs are the nation's most popular and versatile modern building element. In fact, according
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to a government survey prior to the earthquake, CMUs were used in the walls of 76% of single-story and 97% of multistory construction (Institute Haïtien de Statistique et d 'Informatique 2003 'Informatique , 2010 . The housing focus group at the Community Planning Workshop applied the rubric to evaluate more than a dozen primary load-resisting systems (Rebuild Léogâne 2011), a sampling of which are represented with their scores in Fig. 10 . The rubric then facilitates a means to quantitatively assess and compare potential solutions and identify comparative weaknesses and strengths of proposed systems and the tenets they best satisfy. This process was conducted for each system evaluated, and recommendations were made to help further enhance compliance with the Empowerment Model (Rebuild Léogâne 2011). Given that the CMU is the only widely available partitioning and cladding material in Léogâne, the attributes of local availability and construction process drove the empowerment model toward selection of the "lowest hanging fruits" of reinforced load-bearing CMU walls and confined masonry systems, as one would expect. Unfortunately, the rubric, in its current form, cannot predict whether the solution will be truly resilient, feasible, sustainable, and viable enough for the community being served, particularly if the total price of the redesigned system dramatically exceeds the revenue available to families in that income class; it only facilitates objective comparison between solutions. In order to achieve this function, scores and weights would need to be adjusted with a particular demographic in mind, as mentioned in the previous section.
It is not unreasonable that the rubric tends to bias toward existing technologies and systems, as it is difficult to score a proposed system that has not yet been vetted in the free market. Thus, despite the poor performance of CMU walls in the earthquake, CMU construction remains viable due to the lack of other local options that still satisfy the cultural and environmental needs of the community. Load-bearing CMU wall systems primarily served low-income populations in Figure 9 . (a) Third author gathering local input to prioritize attributes of the assessment rubric (photo courtesy of Mark Taylor); (b) first two authors leading a brainstorming exercise during the Community Planning Workshop to identify the spectrum of construction materials for potential housing models Note: CMU = concrete masonry unit; N/A = not applicable.
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Léogâne and did sustain damage in the earthquake, but due to their small size, single-story modality and usually light metal roof, they generally did not experience total collapse but rather loss of one or more walls in brittle shear failure. The reimplementation of this system should include reinforcement of better quality masonry units and a ring beam to tie the system together. However, it must be stressed that lack of quality materials, certified construction, and the finances to procure them will lead to houses that are just as vulnerable as the homes that were destroyed during the earthquake. Sadly, this same concern surfaces as one evaluates options available to middle-and upper-income residents in Léogâne. As Fig. 10 indicates, the formal introduction of confined masonry construction to Haiti scores well across all four tenets as it is a direct extension of current practices using materials already available locally. When executed properly, the system has the flexibility to support multistory construction, which allows the potential for future expansion in dense urban zones-an attribute many Haitians desire. For organizations like Build Change, "minor, low-, or no-cost improvements to existing ways of building" often prove easier "than to introduce a completely new technology or reintroduce a traditional building method" (Hausler 2010 ). The rubric supports this hypothesis. Unfortunately, engineering adequate seismic resilience through higher-quality CMUs and larger quantities of steel can cost up to $20,000, well beyond the reach of most displaced Haitians, who have sporadic sources of income (Phillips 2011) . As a result, the current reconstruction in Léogâne shows limited examples of the successful implementation of confined masonry: CMU construction escalated between July 2011 and December 2011 in Léogâne, and while there is evidence of increased quantities of transverse reinforcement in columns and vertical reinforcement through CMU walls, other necessary features such as ring beams, horizontal wall reinforcement, and effective keying of higher-quality blocks are not yet a consistent practice. In fact, the most consistent mitigation measure that has been taken is the use of lightweight metal roofs framed in timber. Although Haitians still prefer the option to add floors to their homes in the future, the aversion to concrete slabs after the earthquake has increased the use of metal roofs in postquake reconstruction.
PARADIGM SHIFTS TO MAXIMIZE EMPOWERMENT
While the previous section provides immediately implementable options, one should take care in advocating solely these construction modalities for all Haitian urban housing, as many people do not have the financial resources necessary to make masonry systems effective against earthquakes. Indeed, masonry systems are the preferred systems identified by the empowerment model largely because there are no other legitimate free market competitors. For many of the other possible main force resisting systems discussed in the workshop report (Rebuild Léogâne 2011) and shown in Fig. 10 , the lack of native resources and industries to manufacture engineered materials in Haiti led to punitive scoring in the evaluation process. However, many of these systems, including the one presented in the next section, could be dramatically more sustainable, feasible, and resilient if the materials and technologies were locally produced and retailed in the Haitian free market.
Technology Innovations: Alternate Partitioning Systems Considering that CMUs are a staple construction material but also create considerable vulnerabilities in earthquakes, one domain ripe for technology innovation is lightweight partitioning elements to reduce vulnerability but still satisfy cultural expectations for privacy and security within the practical constraints Figure 10 . Composite scores from the assessment of several potential residential housing systems; higher scores represent the most appropriate system based on the criteria and weights used (CMU = concrete masonry unit; RC = reinforced concrete) L e a d e r s h i p a n d M a n a g e m e n t i n E n g i n e e r i n g OCTOBER 2012
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related to the lack of resources and oversight. Interestingly, historical Haitian construction of gingerbread houses (late nineteenth century, European-inspired wood construction), many of which survived the earthquake despite their age and condition [ Fig. 11(a) ], used timber framing with plank walls. These lightweight structures were well adapted to the climate of Haiti and were sustainable prior to deforestation. Therefore, it is of interest to explore technologies sustainable in modern-day Haiti that would permit loadbearing walls to be replaced with frames similarly clad in nonstructural partitioning systems. In fact, by recognizing that most families have limited resources and cannot afford the degree of reinforcement required to aseismically design every wall in a highly partitioned confined masonry home, the adoption of a frame system is preferable because it concentrates structural resistance and thereby limited financial resources in only select elements of the system. While frames could be feasibly made of reinforced concrete using local materials and skill sets-this structural system is already used in commercial structures in Haiti-an equally feasible plank or paneling technology is not available currently. As a result, we propose production of thin panels from a variety of local raw material sources, including precast concrete panels using a lightweight mix reinforced with wire mesh (Morrison 2011) . These lightweight panels are isolated from the primary structural system and help reduce the seismic demand on the home while still maintaining adequate strength to bear the pressure of hurricane-force winds and provide the basic security from intruders necessary in urban zones. The panels can be attached to frames using a simplified fastener and then the joints sealed and the walls continuously finished with mortar and paint. More importantly, since the panels are nonstructural in nature, strict quality control on material properties is not required, allowing them to be produced without the need for heavy machinery or technical training.
Process Innovations: Engineering Quality Control Although the elimination of CMU walls will significantly reduce the seismic demands on the structure, the resistance of the system is no longer distributed and is instead concentrated in the discrete elements of the frame. Therefore, a high degree of quality control is necessary to ensure that the frame is properly designed and constructed, with columns and beams sized and reinforced appropriately. Deficiencies commonly encountered in reinforced concrete construction in Haiti, as discussed previously, include inadequately sized members, insufficient reinforcement (particularly transverse), and poorly mixed concrete. Achieving quality control in each of these facets is difficult in settings where building codes, certification, and inspection are nonexistent. In fact, interviews with Haitians throughout our fieldwork and especially during the Community Planning Workshop demonstrated an overwhelming desire for regulations on any type of construction and a clear recognition of the need for quality control and oversight of construction processes, but also the admission that the government is ill equipped to deliver these presently. As a result, several process innovations will be necessary to support alternative partitioning systems and engineer the frame's quality control explicitly.
The spirit of konbit in Haitian culture evolved in rural areas as a cooperative approach to tending fields and ultimately building basic infrastructure to support one another in a communal effort. A similar approach could be introduced in urban settings through the formation of depots with communal construction kits, including standardized plans for single-story, single-family frame-and-panel homes. To address the three common deficiencies in reinforced concrete L e a d e r s h i p a n d M a n a g e m e n t i n E n g i n e e r i n g construction, depots would make available for rental reusable formwork sized to achieve the dimensions of this standardized home and concrete mixers with measurement trays to guide appropriate raw material proportions. This proposal is consistent with current practices in the country, where construction teams often rent wood for formwork. At these depots, column and beam reinforcing cages and lightweight panels can be prefabricated with greater efficiency, better quality control, and protection against damage and improper execution in the field. The lack of up-front financing implies that the only sustainable housing systems are ones that allow components to be purchased progressively, in the same manner as CMUs. Therefore, the use of prefabrication for not only the panels but also the reinforcing cages in this proposed housing model enables this same purchasing modality as well as quality control.
Bringing Concepts to Market
For this or any alternative to succeed, it ultimately must offer consumers a value proposition and gain consumer trust. In particular, by adopting a frameand-panel style of construction with heavy reliance on prefabrication, the home can be constructed quickly in three stages, as shown in Fig. 12 , dramatically reducing labor and thereby cost. Interior panels can be added later to divide the rooms as the family accumulates savings. When flanked by an appropriate business model that supports capitalization of locally owned and operated depots and maintains profit margins despite consumers' irregular cash flow, this style of frame-and-panel construction can achieve all tenets of the empowerment model and can compete in the free market.
Even by offering the value proposition of a home with the appearance and security of CMUs but without its vulnerabilities and constructed at a fraction of time and cost, the aforementioned solution, as well as any others representing typologies and approaches that deviate from traditional CMU construction, will require exposure within the community to achieve any level of acceptance. While preliminary interviews with displaced Haitians and construction crews indicated willingness and even enthusiasm to consider alternate housing systems [Fig. 11(b) ], these conversations will continue with ongoing surveys in the spring and summer of 2012. Moreover, the introduction of these concepts must again be conscious of Haitians as tangible thinkers who do not speak in hypotheticals. Thus, should the technology prove market ready, education and outreach programming must be offered, including public demonstrations of new systems alongside traditional CMU subassemblies, and ultimately prototype homes should be introduced in partnership with trusted community members as the first owners and operators of depots producing and retailing components and renting construction kits. The effectiveness of such experiential programming is the subject of our ongoing field research slated for the summer of 2012.
CONCLUSION
The 2010 Haiti earthquake was the most destructive event any country has experienced in modern times when measured by lives lost as a percentage of population. For the global community, it is a sobering reminder of the extreme vulnerability of many urban zones throughout the developing world; Haiti was the unfortunate case study where this vulnerability, particularly in housing, was ultimately exposed. It should be no surprise that traditional responses to postdisaster recovery have not extrapolated effectively to Haiti and that this unprecedented disaster has left most of the afflicted families still grappling for lasting, hazard-resilient solutions, despite the millions of dollars pledged in foreign aid. While most agree that a sustainable recovery, with genuine empowerment of the Haitian people at its core, is essential, its achievement has proven elusive. Instead, wellintended efforts have focused on extrapolating imported solutions without a complete understanding of the unique challenges Haitians face, especially the most vulnerable families confined to tent cities Figure 12 . Three-stage construction process for proposed frame-and-panel home: construction of reinforced concrete frame, placement of roof system, and attachment of lightweight panels L e a d e r s h i p a n d M a n a g e m e n t i n E n g i n e e r i n g OCTOBER 2012
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To solve the dilemma of sustainable recovery from large-scale disasters, it is ultimately necessary to tackle the substandard infrastructure that affects the hundreds of millions of people living at the bottom of the economic pyramid worldwide. Unfortunately, the lack of precedent for a disaster whose victims are in such dire economic straits as they were in Haiti has left the civil engineering community at a loss, with many failing to understand that Haiti has unique constraints and that well-intentioned, but poorly informed, rebuilding efforts can actually perpetuate vulnerabilities in the long run. The inability to provide affordable, long-lasting solutions more than 2 years after the earthquake proves that for vulnerable populations, particularly with respect to housing, which remains a privately financed and supervised process, first-world solutions are often inaccessible without complete reliance on foreign aid. First-world good intentions must move from reimplementation of familiar systems toward paradigm shifts that empower the bottom of the pyramid. To do so requires innovation in technologies and processes that address resiliency, feasibility, sustainability, and, most importantly, cultural viability.
Our experiences in postquake Haiti have demonstrated that such pathways to empowerment can indeed be discovered, first and foremost by listening to the community being served, but also with a commitment and patience to follow what inevitably is a long, arduous, and at many times uncertain path to recovery, requiring continuous feedback from the population being served and frequent re-evaluation of priorities and proposed solutions. This is an important lesson that must be learned from this disaster, not only for the people of Haiti, but also for the millions like them throughout the developing world.
